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Abstract
In the last years of the Internet bubble, many managers provided fraudulent ﬁnancial statements with the
aim at inﬂating the market value of their ﬁrms. Is this shortage of honesty an accident or a built-in feature
of shareholder capitalism? This paper argues that in an economy hosting publicly traded companies where
investors have only imperfect information about a ﬁrm’s type and where a honest ﬁnancial report may
be wrong, at least some bad ﬁrms managers will provide false statements. Furthermore, in equilibrium
some good ﬁrm managers may also resort to corrupt auditors which will issue a favorable report without
carrying out any investigation. The frequency of dishonest managers is analyzed in keeping with the
precision of the report and the share of goods ﬁrms in the total number of ﬁrms.
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All scholars in social sciences would agree that what can be called an "ethical behavior" plays
an important role in the well-functioning of capitalist economies: since their resource allocation
system builds on the voluntary exchange between individuals, positive social externalities like
trust, loyalty and truth-telling would oil the economic machinery (Arrow, 1974; McKean, 1975;
Becker, 1976; Hirshleifer, 1977; Noreen, 1988; Brickley et al., 2002). The most optimistic even
argued that in a market economy, individuals would spontaneously prefer honesty to dishonesty
(Kohlberg, 1969, 1981; Frank, 1987).
Yet the wave of corporate scandals that marked the end of the Internet bubble recalled with
strength that in the realm of trust and honesty, shareholder capitalism comes with its own limits.
As noticed by William Donaldson, President of the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission,
“Starting with the unfolding of the Enron story in October 2001, it become apparent that the
boom years had been accompanied by fraud, other misconduct and serious erosion in business
principles” (Donaldson, 2003a). While conﬂicts of interest between managers and shareholders
are old story, the New Economy period proved to be a fertile ground for fraud, which is an extreme
development of this conﬂict (Demski, 2003; Donaldson, 2003a; 2003b; Healy and Palepu, 2003).
In particular, criminal investigations proved that on the eve of the crisis, several large ﬁrm CEOs
resorted to corrupt external auditors to produce false ﬁnancial statements and reaped personal
gains from the resulting short-term overvaluation of their ﬁrms by massively selling their shares
just before the ﬁrm’s collapse (Lev, 2003).1 That places in a new light Arrow’s (1974) work,
who pointed out that nothing guarantees that contemporary capitalist economies can produce the
much needed positive social externalities in a suﬃcient amount.
This paper aims at providing a simple explanation for this documented shortage of honesty by
focusing on the incentives that managers have to manipulate information about the true ﬁnancial
1 This was the case with Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Xerox, Global Crossing, etc...
1status of their ﬁrms. The corporate sector is made up of both solid and fragile ﬁrms. Homogenous
shareholders have only imperfect information about a ﬁrm’s type. The law obliges managers to
provide shareholders with a ﬁnancial report drafted by an external auditor. External auditors
are either honest or corrupt. Honest auditors provide informative but imprecise reports; corrupt
auditors provide faked reports: without investigating the true status of the ﬁrm, a faked report
will state that the audited ﬁrm is solid. Managers choose their reporting strategy with the aim at
pushing as high as possible the market value of the ﬁrm. This assumption is quite realistic, since
in the last years, the largest part of a manager’s compensation was related, one way or another, to
the ﬁrm market value.2 Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) studied a poll of ﬁrms in 31 countries
and observed that earnings’ manipulation is positively related to managers’ beneﬁts.
An equilibrium of this game is deﬁned as a situation where the optimal reporting strategy of
manager and shareholders’ beliefs are mutually consistent. Solving the model, it comes out that,
in general, in equilibrium dishonest managers may be found not only at the head of fragile ﬁrms
but also of solid ﬁrms. Although a faked report costs more than a honest one, a good ﬁrm manager
might still buy one since in this case he takes no risk of getting a wrong assessment. Moreover,
a world of honesty where no manager cheats cannot be an equilibrium of this game. The model
also allows to study the impact of variations in the precision of the honest report and the relative
number of solid ﬁrms on the frequency of dishonest mangers.
The analysis carried out in this paper may be connected to traditional studies in the ﬁnancial
market micro-structure where accounting information is shown to have a bearing on a ﬁrm valu-
ation (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Bushman, Gigler and
Indjejikian, 1996). These papers formalize the price formation process building on the assumption
of heterogenous traders. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, in this paper shareholders are
supposed to be homogenous; in this case the ﬁrm value only reﬂects the common set of beliefs,
2 On average, by 2001, 60% to 70% of a CEO’s compensation came from stock-option grants; stock-options
account for almost 80% of the gain in CEO pay during the past decade (Perel, 2003).
2depending on the manager’s strategy. We also assume that managers who want to get a faked
report can obtain it provided that they pay the price.3
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces basic assumptions and provides




The economy (or the relevant sector) is made up of many publicly traded companies of identical
size. There are two types of ﬁrms: the "good" ﬁrm (type G) has a fundamental value v (with
v>0); the "bad" ﬁrm (type B) has a zero fundamental value. The total number of ﬁrms being
normalized to unity, the frequency of good ﬁrms in total population of ﬁrms is denoted by q.
Risk neutral shareholders know the distribution of types, but do not know the type of each
ﬁrm. A manager knows the fundamental value of his own ﬁrm.
During the relevant time period, managers must provide shareholders with a ﬁnancial report
about the ﬁrm’s fundamentals, issued by an external auditor. There are two types of such ﬁnancial
reports: honest (H) and faked (F). A honest report costs h. It will deliver with precision p ∈]0.5,1[
as i g n a lτ ∈ {g,b} about the ﬁrm’s type; formally: P[b|B,H]=P[g|G,H]=p and P[g|B,H]=
P[b|G,H]=1− p.
A faked report costs f,w i t hf>hwhatever the ﬁrm’s type.4 It provides the signal "good"
(g) with a unit probability, whatever the ﬁrm’s type: P[g|B,F]=P[g|G,F]=1 ;of course,
P[b|B,F]=P[b|G,F]=0 .
Risk neutral managers aim at pushing as high as possible the market value of their ﬁrms. For
3 In a diﬀerent but related framework Newman and Noel (1989) and Patterson and Smith (2003) analyze the
strategic game between a manager who can commit fraud and an auditor who can cover this fraud; they emphasize
the necessary conditions for earnings’ fraudulent overstating to be an equilibrium.
4 The cost of the faked report is identical for both types of ﬁrms since the corrupt auditor will charge it without
carrying out the necessary investigations to ﬁnd out the true type of the ﬁrm.
3so doing, he must choose between buying a honest report or a faked one. The manager bears no
speciﬁc disutility from dealing with a corrupt auditor.5
The sequence of decisions goes like this: at time t =0 , N a t u r ec h o o s e st h et y p eo ft h eﬁrm; at
time t =1 , the manager decides whether to buy a faked or a honest report; at time t =2 , Nature
decides whether the honest report is right or wrong; the faked report will always deliver the signal
g. Investors observe this signal and form their expectations about the market value of the ﬁrm.










































Figure 1: Decision Tree
The fundamental value of a bad ﬁrm is zero, i.e. the ﬁrm is nearly bankrupt. Whatever the
cost of the report, the net value of a bad ﬁrm cannot become negative, given that the ﬁrm’s shares
are publicly traded and the limited liability principle applies. The net fundamental value of a
5 Several economists argued that managers should experience some disutility from lying (Baiman and Lewis,
1989; Koford and Penno, 1992; Brickely, Smith and Zimmerman, 1997).
4good ﬁrm whose manager buys a faked report is v − f, the net fundamental value of a good ﬁrm
whose manager buys a honest report is v − h.
At the end of the game, shareholders observe a signal, that can be either b or g. As shown in
Figure 1, the signal does not allow them to infer the terminal point of the game; for instance a
good signal may be issued by a correct honest report pertaining to a good ﬁrm, by a wrong honest
report pertaining to a bad ﬁrm, or any faked report.
2.2 Conditional probabilities
Let us denote by πF
G (and respectively πF
B) the shareholder subjective priors that the manager of
a good (respectively bad) ﬁrm buys a faked report:
πF
G = P[F|G] (1)
πF
B = P[F|B] (2)
Given these beliefs, we can determine P[τ|T], i.e. the conditional probability that the signal is




G + p(1 − πF
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=( 1 − p)(1 − πF
G) (4)
P[g|B]=P[g,F|B]+P[g,H|B]
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= p(1 − πF
B)
We apply now the Bayes rule to determine P[T|τ], i.e. the conditional probability that shareholders
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(1 − q)p(1 − πF
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q(1 − p)(1 − πF
G)+( 1− q)p(1 − πF
B)
(10)
2.3 The ﬁrm market value according to the signal
Let us denote the ﬁrm market value by W, and study this variable in keeping with the signal
delivered by the ﬁnancial report.
When the report issues a bad signal (b), it may come only from a honest report. Hence, when
shareholders observe such a signal, the expected market value of the ﬁrm is:
E[W|b]=( v − h)P[G|b]
=( v − h)
q(1 − p)(1 − πF
G)
(1 − p)(1 − πF
G)q + p(1 − πF
B)(1 − q)
. (11)
When the signal is good (g), it may result either from a honest or a dishonest report; shareholders’
expectations about the ﬁrm market value are:
E[W|g]=( v − h)P[G,H|g]+( v − f)P[G,F|g]
6=( v − h)P[H|G,g]P[G|g]+( v − f)P[F|G,g]P[G|g]. (12)
Given that P[H|G,g]=1− P[F|G,g], the expected market value can be written:
E[W|g]=vP[G|g] − hP[H|G,g]P[G|g] − fP[F|G,g]P[G|g]
= P[G|g]{v − hP[H|G,g] − fP[F|G,g]}. (13)
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The manager chooses his reporting policy so as to push as high as possible the ﬁrm market value.
Let EM[W|T,A] denote the expected market value of the ﬁrm from the manager’s point of view,
contingent about the type of the ﬁrm T and the chosen reporting policy A ∈ {H,F}.
a) Whatever the type T ∈ {B,G} of the ﬁrm, when the manager buys a faked report (A = F),
it will provide the good signal with a unit probability. Thus,
EM[W|T,F]=E[W|g]. (17)
b) The manager of a bad ﬁrm (T = B) who decides to buy a honest report (A = H) will get
with probability p the bad signal and with probability (1−p) the good signal (when the report is
7wrong). The expected ﬁrm market value is:
EM[W|B,H]=E[W|b]P[b|B,H]+E[W|g]P[g|B,H]
= pE[W|b]+( 1− p)E[W|g]. (18)
c) The manager of a good ﬁrm (T = G) who decides to buy a honest report (A = H) expects the
market value:
EM[W|G,H]=E[W|g]P[g|G,H]+E[W|b]P[b|G,H]
= pE[W|g]+( 1− p)E[W|b]. (19)
We may now put forward the decision rules of the managers, depending of the type of the ﬁrm.
A bad ﬁrm manager buys the faked report if:
EM[W|B,F] >E M[W|B,H]
⇔ E[W|g] > (1 − p)E[W|g]+pE[W|b]
⇔ E[W|g] >E [W|b]. (20)
His optimal strategy is:
The bad ﬁrm managers plays:

      
      
F,i fE[W|g] >E [W|b]
F or H, if E[W|g]=E[W|b]
H, if E[W|g] <E [W|b]
. (21)
A good ﬁrm manager buys the faked report if:
EM[W|G,F] >E M[W|G,H]
⇔ E[W|g] >p E [W|g]+( 1− p)E[W|b]
⇔ E[W|g] >E [W|b]. (22)
8His optimal strategy is:
The good ﬁrm manager plays:

      
      
F,i fE[W|g] >E [W|b]
F or H, if E[W|g]=E[W|b]
H, if E[W|g] <E [W|b]
. (23)
It can be seen that, whatever a ﬁrm’s type, managers have the same strategy. Therefore, at the
outset of the game, the optimal strategy of a manager is independent of the ﬁrm’s type.
3 Equilibria
3.1 Deﬁnitions
We deﬁne an Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game as a situation where, given shareholder
beliefs, managers play their optimal strategy and where shareholders beliefs are correct given
manager best strategy. Three types of equilibria may be put forward, depending on the link
between the policy implemented by the manager and the type of his ﬁrm.
A separating equilibrium occurs if the reporting policy is representative of the type of the ﬁrm;
for instance, such an equilibrium exists if all good ﬁrm managers buy honest reports and, at the
same time, all bad ﬁrm managers buy faked ones; another separating equilibrium would depict
the opposite situation where all the good ﬁrm managers buy dishonest reports and all bad ﬁrm
managers buy honest ones. A pooling equilibrium corresponds to a situation where all managers
follow the same policy (all managers buy a honest report or all managers buy a faked report);
there is no relationship between the ﬁrm type and the observed policy. In a hybrid equilibrium the
manager optimally randomizes between the two pure strategies (separating and pooling equilibria
can then be seen as particular cases of hybrid equilibria).
Proposition 1 T h eg a m eh a sn os e p a r a t i n ge q u i l i b r i u m .
Proof. From inspection of the optimal contingent strategies (21) and (23), it comes out that
if E[W|g] >E [W|b], all managers (from both good and bad ﬁrms) buy a faked report and if
E[W|g] <E [W|b], all managers buy a honest report.
9The game might present pooling or hybrid equilibria.
3.2 Pooling equilibria
Given that managers dispose of only two reporting policies, two pooling equilibria may be consid-
ered: either all managers are honest or all of them are dishonest.
Proposition 2 A pooling equilibrium where all managers behave honestly (πF
G = πF
B =0 )cannot
be a solution of this game.
Proof. For πF
G = πF





q(1 − p)(v − h)
(1 − p)q + p(1 − q)
E[W|g]=
qp(v − h)
qp+( 1− q)(1 − p)
. (24)
From (21) and (23), honesty is the best strategy if E[W|b] >E [W|g], i.e. if:
E[W|b]=
q(1 − p)(v − h)
(1 − p)q + p(1 − q)
>
qp(v − h)
qp+( 1− q)(1 − p)
= E[W|g]
⇐⇒ (1 − p)[qp+( 1− q)(1 − p)] >p[(1 − p)q + p(1 − q)]
⇐⇒ (1 − p)2 >p 2.
Given that p ∈]0.5,1], this inequality is impossible.
In other words, when shareholders believe that all reports are fair, managers from both the
good and the bad ﬁrms have a strong incentive to provide a faked report. Hence, these "optimistic"
beliefs are not sustainable.
Proposition 3 A pooling equilibrium where all managers behave dishonestly (πF
G = πF
B =1 )may
be a solution of this game.
Proof. For πF
G =1 , the probability P[G|b] is not deﬁned. However, a solution can be obtained
by introducing a convention about shareholders’ beliefs. Let us consider that when all managers
are dishonest (thus buy faked reports which deliver good signals), should shareholders observe a







10The expected ﬁrm value contingent upon the signal become:
E[W|b]=( v − h)P[G|b]=0 , (26)
and:
E[W|g]=( v − h)P[G,H|g]+( v − f)P[G,F|g]
=( v − h)P[H|G,g]P[G|g]+( v − f)P[F|G,g]P[G|g]








Given that E[W|g] >E [W|b],w h a t e v e rt h eﬁrm’s type, the manager optimal strategy is to play




We study next hybrid equilibria where some bad ﬁrm managers and some good ﬁrm managers
buy a faked report, i.e. πF
G ∈]0,1[ and πF
B ∈]0,1[.
If a hybrid equilibrium were to exist, managers from both bad and good ﬁrms must be indif-
ferent between following one or the other strategy (F or H). From inspection of the decision rules
(21) and (23) it comes out that EM[W|B,F]=EM[W|B,H] and EM[W|G,F]=EM[W|G,H] if:
E[W|g]=E[W|b]. (28)
So (28) is a general condition for obtaining a mixed strategy equilibrium. Replacing the two
expected values by their expressions (11) and (16), the former condition becomes:
q
©£
p +( 1− p)πF
G
¤














q(1 − p)(1 − πF
G)(v − h)
(1 − p)(1 − πF
G)q + p(1 − πF
B)(1 − q)
. (29)
Thus a hybrid equilibrium might occur for any couple (πF
G,πF
B) with πF
G ∈ [0,1] and πF
B ∈ [0,1]
satisfying equation (29). In this case, all managers are indiﬀerent between providing a honest or
a faked report. They thus choose at random the type of the report they ask for. The equilibrium
11values πF
G and πF
B, may be interpreted either as an objective or a subjective probability, given
that, in equilibrium, objective and subjective probabilities must be identical.
Formally, the relationship between the equilibrium values of πF
G and πF
B can be written as an
implicit function, Φ(πF
G,πF
B)=const. After some rather tedious calculations, πF
B can be written
as a continuous convex function of πF
G,w i t hπF













An equilibrium exists when both πF
G ∈ [0,1] and πF
B ∈ [0,1].W eﬁrst notice that πF
G =1⇒
πF
B =1:the second pooling equilibrium appears as the limit case of the hybrid equilibrium.
Remark also that πF
G =0⇒ πF
B ∈]0,1[. In other words, even if all good ﬁrm managers choose to
provide a honest report, at least some bad ﬁrm managers will provide a faked report. This result
is unsurprising given that, under our assumptions, the manager of a bad ﬁrm bears no additional
cost from cheating.
Proposition 4 There is a continuum of couples (πF
G,πF
B) consistent with the hybrid equilibrium.
Proof. Given that function (30), is continuous on the interval [0,1],a n dt h a tπF




B =1 , there are an inﬁnity of couples (πF
G,πF
B) with πF
G ∈ [0,1] and
πF
B ∈ [0,1] which verify equation (29).
Function (30) indicate the relationship between the equilibrium values of πF
G and πF
B. For any
of theses couples, neither lenders nor managers would change their strategy. Yet the model does
not say how one of these equilibria actually materializes. Several conjectures may be considered.
For instance, the observed equilibrium may be the outcome of a set of self-fulﬁlling prophecies,
thus any couple (πF
G,πF
B) can be an equilibrium provided that the actual frequencies of corrupt
managers match shareholders priors. Or it may be surmised that the public opinion has a strong
inﬂuence on shareholders beliefs. After the burst of the Internet bubble, a poll of opinions run
by the Harvard Business School and the Pew Research Center in July 2002 showed that only
1223% of Americans would trust bosses of large companies (yet 75% trusted people who run small
businesses).7 Legal cases may also give an indication of the frequency of dishonest managers at
t h eh e a do fb a dﬁrms: from October 1st through June 30th 2003, the US Security and Exchange
Commission ﬁled 443 enforcement actions, 137 of which involved ﬁnancial fraud on reporting.
Eleven companies have been suspended from trading, and the assets of 30 companies have been
frozen. These numbers compare with the overall 15000 US public companies under the SEC
supervision.8 More determinism could be introduced into the model if the objective probability
of getting a faked were inferred from the optimal behavior of the auditor.
Several properties of the hybrid equilibrium may be put forward by further analysis of function







G)2 +2 q(v − h)(f − h)πF
G +( v − f)(v − h) − q(v − h)2
p(1 − q)[v − πF
Gf − (1− πF
G)h]2 . (31)






2(1 − p)(v − h)(v − f)(f − h)
p(1 − q)[v − (1 − πF
G)h − πF
Gf]3 > 0. (32)
Remark that the ﬁrst derivative (equation 31) is positive when evaluated for πF
G =0if and only







Given convexity, this is a suﬃcient condition for function (30) to be monotonously increasing in
πF
G. In this case, for any value of πF
G ∈ [0,1[ there is one single value of πF
B ∈]0,1[ so that condition
(28) is fulﬁlled. In the opposite case, (v −h)/(f −h) < (1−q)−1, the ﬁrst derivative at πF
G =0is
negative, and for some values of πF
G the function may take negative values; in this case, the hybrid
equilibrium does not exist.
7 See "A survey of corporate leadership", The Economist, October 25th 2003.
8 See Press Release by SEC Chairman, William Donaldson, and Deputy Attorney General, Larry Thompson,
on July 22, 2003; www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/press/072203whitehousecftfbrieﬁng.htm.
13Condition (33) is probably true in the context of our problem given that, in general, the
market capitalization of publicly traded companies is quite large. To get some intuition, if the
faked report costs twice the price of a honest report and the frequency of good companies is q =0 .9,
the derivative at πF
G =0is positive if the fundamental value of the ﬁrm is bigger than nine times
the cost of the honest report. For the purpose of parsimony, in the following we develop only on
this case. The opposite case, which would occur if the ﬁrm is relatively small or the frequency of
good ﬁrms is quite large, could be analyzed according to the same methodology.
Figure 2 displays πF
B (vertical axis) as a function of πF
G (horizontal axis) for p =0 .75,q=0 .9,
v =1 0 0 ,f=1 0 , and h =5 . Every point of the curve corresponds to an equilibrium. Hence the
curve may be interpreted as the equilibrium locus.
Figure 2: The equilibrium locus
The model does not allow to determine the impact of a change in the parameter values on the
equilibrium, i.e. to determine the simultaneous impact of dp or dq on both πF
B and πF
G. All it can
say is how one equilibrium value does change when the other one is kept constant.
Proposition 5 I nah y b r i de q u i l i b r i u m ,f o rac o n s t a n tπF
G, the probability that bad ﬁrm managers
will buy a faked report (πF
B) is increasing with the precision of the report and decreasing with the
frequency of good ﬁrms in the total population of ﬁrms.
14Proof. Let us consider function (30).
The sign of the partial derivative of πF







G(f − h)+( 1− q)(v − h)]
p2(1 − q)[v − πF
Gf − (1− πF
G)h]
> 0.
The sign of the partial derivative of πF







G)(1 − p)(f − h)
p(1 − q)2[v − πF
Gf − (1 − πF
G)h]
< 0. (34)
Proposition 6 I nah y b r i de q u i l i b r i u m ,f o rac o n s t a n tπF
B, the probability that good ﬁrm man-
agers will buy a faked report is decreasing with the precision of the report and increasing with the
frequency of good ﬁrms in the total population of ﬁrms.





























































Graphically, the model allows to study how the equilibrium locus (the plot of function 30)
shifts when parameters change. However, the above mentioned partial derivatives may point to
the possible direction of global change. Since managers are "small", they might take as given the
decisions of the other managers. In this case, when they observe a variation — let say in p, the
precision of the report — bad ﬁrm managers will cheat more, good ﬁrm managers will cheat less.
Parameter changes bring about opposite variations in the two equilibrium values.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Corporate scandals that surfaced after the burst of the Internet bubble cast new doubts about
the ability of developed economies to produce the optimal amount of positive social externalities
15like trust, truth-telling and loyalty. This paper analyses managers’ decision on whether to disclose
a honest or a faked report when shareholders have only imperfect information about a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial status. While a faked report costs more than a honest one, by manipulating information,
managers may push up the share price.
The game presents multiple equilibria. In some of them, not only managers at the head of
fragile ﬁrms choose to get a faked report, but also those in charge with strong ﬁrms. By so doing,
good ﬁrm managers avoid the risk of a wrong assessment. Yet empirical studies might not be able
to reveal this manipulation given that such a faked report is actually right. Criminal case may
reveal ex-post frauds committed by bad ﬁrm managers; in this case the report is materially false.
If the frequency of good ﬁrms goes up, the probability that the good signal is representative of
ab a dﬁrm increases; therefore incentives for the bad ﬁrm manager to buy a faked report decline.
This ﬁnding appears to be consistent with reported facts. Lev (2003, p.40) mentioned that "a large
number of [earnings] manipulations occur in the volatile high-tech and science based sectors and
are often committed when a company falls on hard times or during periods of economic downturn".
Interpreted at the economy-wide level, manager dishonesty tends to be more widespread in poorly
performing economies than in healthy ones.9 Many empirical studies have unveiled a positive
link between macroeconomic performance and corruption levels (e.g., Mauro, 1995; 1996). If
the precision of the report increases, chances that a honest auditor gets wrong and claims that
ab a dﬁrm is actually good will decline. In equilibrium, if the precision is improved, more bad
management ﬁrms will recourse to corrupt auditors, whatever the number of good ﬁrms that deliver
faked reports. Finally, it should be noticed that, under our assumptions, a world of honesty where
no manager cheats cannot be a solution of this game, while the symmetric pooling equilibrium,
w h e r ea l la r ed i s h o n e s t ,c a nb e .
Like in many other studies, our conclusions are not independent from the main assumptions.
9 Besancenot and Vranceanu (2002) reached a similar conclusion from a model of foreign investment in emerging
economies.
16One may point out that even an audit company as strong as Andersen has been pulled out of the
marked on allegations of corruption, so it is irrealistic to suppose that over the long run managers
do have the possibility to get faked reports. In defence of our assumption we recall that the model
requires no upper limit on the price to be paid for this "service", so dishonest managers may bribe
at least one auditor. We also have assumed that the manager aims at inﬂating the ﬁrm market
value in order to reap a personal gain. Sometimes managers attempt to manipulate earnings only
to buy time until the economic outlook gets better. In this case, the recourse to corrupt auditors
could entail a limited but positive eﬀect. Investigating this additional channel may provide an
interesting path for further research. Despite these limitations, the model is interesting since it
emphasizes, within a simple analytical framework, how imperfect information can set a natural
limit on manager honest behavior.
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